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Abstract: This article explores the influence of competitive conditions on the 
evolutionary fitness of different risk preferences. As a practical example, the 
professional competition between fund managers is considered. To explore how 
different settings of competition parameters, the exclusion rate and the exclusion 
interval, affect individual investment behavior, an evolutionary model based on a 
genetic algorithm is developed. The simulation experiments indicate that the 
influence of competitve conditions on investment behavior and attitudes towards risk 
is significant. What is alarming is that intense competitive pressure generates risk-
seeking behavior and undermines the predominance of the most skilled. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Evolutionary selection leads to the predominance of the fittest. Without a doubt, this 
proposition is true, being tautological. However, we are sometimes surprised about which 
behavior actually turns out to be “fittest”, in the very sense of evolutionarily superior. This 
also applies to the field of economics.  
Of course, economics does not refer to evolution in the original sense of the reproduction of 
the superior and genetic progress between generations. Rather, we assume that selection is 
conducted by market competition rewarding the best with economic wealth and driving the 
worst into bankruptcy. To give an example, Milton Friedman [14, p.23] stated that profit 
maximization is an “appropriate summary” of the conditions of survival, delivering an 
exemplar for the assumption that competition would favor agents who behave optimally, or 
rationally, from the angle of economic theory. Today, there is a myriad of studies, many using 
modeling techniques, which provide strong evidence that this assumption is sometimes 
misleading. [30], for instance, shows that Friedman’s proposition is not valid, if deviating 
from profit maximization is less harmful for the firm considered than for its contenders. 
The present study is related to the class of evolutionary models in which agents are 
represented by financial traders and ways of behavior are typically trading strategies. To 
provide a brief overview, models in this field can be classified into two groups. The first one 
has been described by [18] as adaptive belief systems (ABS). ABS are formed by boundedly 
rational traders having different expectations about the future. Traders select strategies with 
reference to the utility generated by the rules in the past. Typically, utility is measured by the 
realized net or risk-adjusted profits produced. Evolution is reflected in the change of fractions 
of beliefs or strategies in the population of traders. Normally, these strategies are either based 
on technical or fundamental analysis. One of the most important insights provided by ABS is 
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that under certain conditions, apparently irrational noise traders are able to survive 
evolutionary competition and attain similar profits as fundamentalists, as demonstrated by 
[7,10,11, and 18]. 
The second group of models assumes a more Darwinian interpretation of evolutionary 
competition. Instead of its potential to maximize agents’ utility, these studies evaluate the 
evolutionary fitness of a strategy in terms of its ability to survive market selection in the long 
run. In [4], for instance, this ability is determined by the expected growth rates of the wealth 
share. Based on this criterion, the authors develop a general equilibrium model of a 
dynamically complete asset market, in which prices are formed endogenously and the set of 
strategies available is constant. It is found that, contrary to the common belief, the market 
does not necessarily select investors with rational expectations. [12] confirms this result for 
incomplete markets, and [2] explores its conditions for general strategies. In contrast, [29] 
illustrates that rational expectations do prevail if the intertemporal discount factor is equal 
among agents. The heterogeneity of findings is dissolved by [5] who show that for any 
Pareto-optimal allocation, the selection for or against rational expectations is determined 
entirely by discount factors and beliefs.  
The present article deals with one aspect of behavior which has been vastly ignored in the 
field of studies described above: differences in risk preferences.2 Risk preferences are relevant 
if decisions are to be made under uncertainty, that is, when agents know merely the 
probabilities of the possible consequences of an action. A large body of experimental 
                                                 
2 The interest of such questions, however, is noted relatively early. In his eponymous study on “some elementary 
selection processes in economics”, M.J. Farrell (1970) [13] develops two abstract probabilistic models of an 
evolutionary asset market, and finds that “a large group of inept speculator will always be present”. Having 
regard to future research, he remarks: “Also interesting, […], is to allow the variance of the probability 
distribution of the outcome of the gamble to vary independently of expected return and so permit a comparison 
of the effects of selection on risk-seekers and risk-averters.” 
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evidence has led to the notion that human beings behave in a risk-averse manner (at least 
when the situation of decision making is about the realization of monetary gains), that is, they 
prefer to get a definite payoff towards a lottery with an expectation equal to this payoff [1, 3, 
19]. Economic modelers adopt this finding by using CARA (Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion) or CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility functions. Others assume 
agents to be risk neutral, meaning that they simply seek to maximize expected payoffs. Risk-
seeking behavior, however, is usually excluded from consideration. 
With regards to the subprime crisis, the exclusion of risk-seeing behavior is not easy to 
justify. Hoping for supreme returns, professional investors deposited huge amounts of capital 
in assets whose fundamental value was far exceeded, and appeared not to avoid risk at all. 
How can that be? The finding that human beings behave in a risk-averse manner depends on 
the condition that the individuals’ goal is to maximize their own utility. However, when being 
in competition with each other, the criterion of selection is not necessarily individual utility 
but the payoff per se may be crucial for survival. As a result, risk-seeking behavior should not 
be excluded ex ante, and we should assume that it is adopted whenever it provides a 
competitive advantage. 
One goal of the present study is to explore in which competitive conditions this is true. In 
general, the study aims at improving our understanding about how competitive conditions 
influence the evolutionary fitness of different risk preferences. To this purpose, the article is 
divided into two major parts. The first part (section two) represents an abstract, theoretical 
reflection about the evolutionary potential of risk-seeking behavior. In the second part 
(section three), we present a practical example of a competitive scenario in which risk-
preferences play a central role: the competition among fund managers. To explore this 
scenario, we construct an evolutionary model, in which agents differ in terms of the risk-
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return profile of their asset portfolio. Competitive pressure is created by exclusions of the 
worst performing managers. The discards are then replaced by newcomers, whose investment 
behavior results from a genetic algorithm. Competition parameters are the interval in which 
exclusions take place and the share of agents to be excluded. Specific research questions are: 
- Will evolutionary competition always lead to the prevalence of agents with efficient 
portfolios? 
- Which portfolios will be fittest under different settings of the competition parameters?  
Our experiments show that agents tend to build conservative but efficient portfolios if the 
exclusion rate is low. Agents’ risk-aversion becomes less if the exclusion rate rises, and/or if 
the exclusion interval is prolonged. Notably, if the exclusion rate is high and the exclusion 
interval is low, agents completely deviate from risk-averse behavior but take great risks, 
although the additional risk does not improve the expected return of their portfolios. Under 
these competitive conditions, even agents with inefficient portfolios can survive. These results 
are alarming as they suggest that intense competitive pressure triggers the acceptance of 
excessive risk and undermines the prevalence of the most skilled. 
2. A THEORETICAL VIEW ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ADVANTAGE OF RISK-SEEKING 
BEHAVIOR 
The rational choice between several actions implies the evaluation of the consequences of the 
alternatives. In reality, however, individuals usually do not know which consequence an 
action will have but estimate probabilities about the likelihood of a certain outcome – the 
decision has to be made “under uncertainty”. Decisions under uncertainty are frequent in 
economic contexts. Calculating the profitability of a potential investment, for example, 
requires information about the future development of revenues, interest-rates, prices etc. Yet, 
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as respective predictions may be subject to error, the present value of the investment cannot 
be identified definitely. Nevertheless, existing information can be used to establish a set of 
possible outcomes and to assign probabilities to each of them. If the set of outcomes is 
continuous (instead of discrete), the probability distribution over this set is often assumed to 
follow a normal distribution. The latter applies, for instance, for the future return of asset 
portfolios [24, 25].3 
Figure 1 shows the probability density functions of two normal distributions (profile 1 and 2). 
The curves may be interpreted as the payoff profiles of two ways of behavior, or more 
specifically, of two asset portfolios. The profiles differ in terms of the expected payoff, μ, and 
the payoff variance, ߪଶ. Obviously, economic theory would predict that individuals strongly 
prefer profile 1 towards 2, because 1 affords the better expected payoff (ߤଵ ൐ ߤଶ) at the lower 
variance (ߪଵଶ ൏ ߪଶଶ), and subjects are commonly assumed to be risk-averse or risk-neutral. 
Adopting the latter assumption, portfolio theory [24, 25] distinguishes between efficient and 
inefficient portfolios. Profile 2 represent an inefficient portfolio, defined as any composition 
of assets for which there exists an alternative one which offers a better expected payoff 
without implying a greater payoff variance (here: profile 1). 
-- Figure 1 -- 
From the angle of economic theory, the attractiveness of profile 1 towards 2 seems, therefore, 
to be evident. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory [33], however, ranking the 
alternatives is more ambiguous. The reason is that in this theory, ways of behavior are not 
evaluated through the individual utility produced but through their ability to generate an 
outcome which assures survival. The degree to which a certain behavior improves 
                                                 
3 Although this is a simplification because financial dynamics reveal power-law behavior which leads to heavier 
tails of the return distribution than predicted by the normal distribution [15]. 
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survivability is called evolutionary fitness. The credo is that the fittest strategies will tend to 
dominate in the long-run as rivals die out sooner or later. Therefore, if individuals are in 
competition with each other, the fittest strategy must be established. 
Figure 1 indicates that this strategy cannot be identified uniquely. Rather, the evolutionary 
fitness of both profiles depends on the precise payoff needed to survive and, thus, on 
competitive conditions. This argument can be illustrated formally as follows: With k being the 
threshold outcome needed to survive, the evolutionary fitness, F, of some behavior ߙ, can be 
written as: 
ܨఈሺ݇ሻ ൌ ׬ ܲܦܨఈஶ௫ୀ௞ ሺݔሻ (1) 
Based on this principle, some behavior ߙ is fitter than any alternative behavior ߚ if and only if 
ߙ offers a higher probability to attain an outcome greater than k. Formally: 
ߙ	 ≫ 	ߚ ↔ ܨఈሺ݇ሻ ൐ ܨఉሺ݇ሻ (2) 
where “≫” should be read as “dominates”, in the sense of “fitter as”.  
For any ݇ with ݇ ൏ 	ܽ, it is easy to see that ׬ ܲܦܨଵ௫ୀ௞ିஶ ሺݔሻ ൏ ׬ ܲܦܨଶ
௫ୀ௞
ିஶ ሺݔሻ and, thus, 
׬ ܲܦܨଵାஶ௫ୀ௞ ሺݔሻ ൐ ׬ ܲܦܨଶ
ାஶ
௫ୀ௞ ሺݔሻ. In other words, whenever preventing relatively bad 
outcomes (equal or smaller than a) is sufficient for survival, profile 1 strictly dominates 2.  
In contrast, for any ݇ ൐ 	ܾ, it can be seen that ׬ ܲܦܨଵାஶ௫ୀ௞ ሺݔሻ ൏ ׬ ܲܦܨଶ
ାஶ
௫ୀ௞ ሺݔሻ. Accordingly, 
if survival requires large outcomes, profile 2 provides the better fitness.  
The considerations above are kept as simple as possible but convey an important message: A 
strategy which is worse than another with regards to its expected outcome but equipped with 
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larger outcome variance may still be prevalent in a competitive environment if competitive 
conditions are appropriate. Proposition 1 takes this insight onto a more general level. 
Proposition 1: 
Assume two behaviors, 1 and 2, whose outcomes are distributed normally with means ݑଵ and 
ݑଶ and variances ߪଵଶ and ߪଶଶ. Furthermore, assume that ݑଵ 	൐ 	ݑଶ with ሼݑଵ, ݑଶሽ ∈ ሿെ∞;൅∞ሾ	 
and ߪଵଶ ൏ ߪଶଶ. Then, for any setting of ൛ݑଵ,ݑଶ, ߪଵଶ, ߪଶଶ	ൟ complying with the above conditions, 
there is some threshold payoff k for which behavior 2 dominates 1 according to definition (2). 
(Proof in appendix) 
Proposition 1 has a meaningful implication for the selection among agents. Why? Maximizing 
outcome expectation at a given outcome variance requires knowledge, skill, or other abilities. 
Portfolio theory, for example, teaches the theoretical knowledge to maximize expected return 
on investment at a given risk through intelligent composition of assets. To increase outcome 
variance at a given expectation, however, such abilities are not essential. Taking risks, 
respectively gambling, is sufficient. Against this background, proposition 1 can be read as 
follows. Under the assumption that undertaking risks increases the probability of attaining 
extreme outcomes, any less capable group can succeed in competition with a higher capable 
group if it undertakes enough risk and if the outcome needed to survive is sufficiently high. In 
respective scenarios, risk-seeking behavior per se provides evolutionary fitness.  
The evolutionary model presented in the next section aims at sharpening our understanding 
about how such competitive scenarios may arise in practice, and how the outcome needed to 
survive can result endogenously from competitive conditions. The insights gained in this 
section will be helpful to interpret the simulation results obtained.  
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3. EXAMPLE: AN ABSTRACT MODEL OF THE COMPETITION AMONG FUND MANAGERS 
This section highlights an evolutionary model of the professional competition among fund 
managers. This practical example is appropriate as it fulfills two important conditions: (i) 
Agents compete with each other through the outcome generated by their behavior, and (ii) 
risk-preferences are a crucial determinant of this behavior. Section 3.1 introduces the model, 
Section 3.2 describes the setup of the simulation experiments, and Section 3.3 presents the 
simulation results.  
3.1 The model 
The competition among fund managers has been sketched recently by N.N. Thaleb in [31]. 
The author, himself a fund manager for several years, indicates that fluctuation in the 
profession is large. Professional status is highly dependent on the profitability of the 
managers’ investments and changes quickly. In particular, unsuccessful managers are 
dismissed rapidly, no matter if their failing was due to chance or lack of skill. Empirical 
studies confirming and extending these insights include [8, 9, 16, and 20]. [8] and [16], for 
instance, report that differences of the performance and the risk involved between mutual 
funds can be attributed to the behavior and different characteristics of the individual 
managers. [20] shows that manager performance, which is either measured in terms of the 
adjusted asset growth rates or in terms of fund portfolio returns, is indeed used as selection 
criterion since “there is an inverse relation between the managerial performance and fund 
performance”. Finally, [9] delivers evidence that managers react to the resulting competitive 
pressure by adjusting their investment behavior, and more specifically, their attitude towards 
risk. For example, young managers are found to hold more conservative portfolios since they 
are more likely to be replaced when performing badly.  
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In the following, a model which replicates the real competition in a stylized fashion will be 
introduced. As its principle, the approach rests on agent-based modeling. Agent-based 
modeling is the reproduction of complex systems through the formulation of specific 
assumptions about the behavior of agents and their interaction. The collective volumes [28 
and 32] demonstrate the potential of this method for the analysis of social and financial systems. 
Note that our model is not meant to be a precise reproduction of reality but to uncover 
emergent phenomena on a general level and in a tractable framework. For a better overview, 
the framework will be described in three parts: (i) the investment logic, (ii) the selection 
mechanism, and (iii) the genetic algorithm, with (ii) and (iii) representing characteristic 
elements of an evolutionary model.  
(i)  Investment Logic:  
The investment logic can be summarized by the following rules:  
(1) Each agent i disposes of some amount of capital at some period t, denoted by ܥ௜,௧. ܥ௜,௧ is 
invested into two classes of assets: a riskless and a risky one.  
(2) Assets of the riskless class offer a constant, real return, ߤ௅. The real return produced by 
risky assets follows a normal distribution with mean ߤோ and variance ߪோଶ, with ߤோ ൐ ߤ௅, 
and ߪோଶ ൐ 0. 
(3) The share of capital invested in the risky asset by agent i is expressed by ݏ௜. ݏ௜ is a mirror 
of i’s degree of risk-aversion: A lower ݏ௜, reflects greater risk-aversion, as i is willing to 
forego more payoff on average for the purpose of a lower likelihood of extremely bad 
payoffs.  
(4) Furthermore, agents can undertake additional risk, denoted by ߜ. The additional risk of 
the portfolio of agent i, ߜ௜, increases the variance of the portfolio without improving the 
expected return.  
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(5) Portfolios pay-off in every period t, and the pay-off generated is reinvested instantly. 
Consequently, the evolution of capital results as:   
ܥ௜,௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݃௜,௧ሻܥ௜,௧, ݓ݅ݐ݄	 ௜݃,௧ ∈ ܰሺߤ௜, ߪ௜ଶሻ	, (3) 
where ݃௜,௧ stands for the real return of i’s portfolio in period t; ߤ௜ is the expected return 
and ߪ௜ଶ the variance of i’s portfolio. Returns ݃௜,௧ are assumed to be independent between 
agents.   
The investment logic defined above is fairly simple but allows a large range of portfolios. In 
accordance with portfolio theory, the portfolio of some agent i can be described by its 
expected payoff, ߤ௜, and the payoff variance, ߪ௜ଶ. In our model, both values are determined by 
the two attributes of the respective agents: the share of capital invested in the risky asset, ݏ௜, 
and the amount of additional risk taken, ߜ௜. We get: 
ߤ௜ ൌ ݏ௜ ∗ ߤோ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݏ௜ሻߤ௅ (4) 
and 
ߪ௜ଶ ൌ ݏ௜ ∗ ߪோଶ ൅ ߜ௜  (5) 
Figure 2 illustrates the resulting set of possible portfolios in the common form of a risk-return 
diagram [6].  
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
The diagram shows that, depending on the choice of ݏ௜ and ߜ௜, efficient as well as inefficient 
portfolios may occur. If ߜ௜ ൌ 0 (black line), an efficient portfolio results because, given the 
respective payoff variance, it is not possible to achieve a better return expectation. For any 
ߜ௜ ൐ 0 and ݏ௜ ൏ 1 (gray area), the portfolio is inefficient since a higher expected return could 
be attained at equal risk by increasing ݏ௜. This is not possible if ߜ௜ ൐ 0 and ݏ௜ ൌ 1 (gray line); 
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hence, the portfolio is efficient. In principle, portfolios can be any in the gray area and on its 
borders (including the infinite, omitted range following on the right which corresponds to a 
further rise of ߜ௜). 
Let us conclude by a brief comment on the variable ߜ௜. Through ߜ௜, the model setup implies 
that the variance of the portfolio return can be raised arbitrarily. This may appear to be an 
unrealistic assumption. However, achieving greater outcome variance in reality requires little. 
Placing the raw investment payoff on bets with an expected return of zero is sufficient, 
technically. The analogue of the financial world would be investments in speculative assets 
with the chance for extreme returns but relatively poor expectation (e.g. so-called Junk 
Bonds). Choosing such assets, or respectively a positive value of ߜ௜, can be interpreted as 
risk-seeking behavior. On the other hand, if ߜ௜ ൐ 0 implies an inefficient portfolio, a positive 
ߜ௜ can be read as lack of skill: The agent could attain a better expectation at equal risk but she 
has simply not learned the appropriate investment behavior.  
(ii)  Selection Mechanism:  
The selection mechanism, as one of the principal elements of an evolutionary model, is 
essential for the evolution of the population. For this purpose, the selection alternatives (here: 
different investment behaviors represented by the agents using them) are evaluated by a 
defined criterion, setting them in competition with each other. The better an alternative fulfills 
the target, the higher the likelihood of spreading instead of dying out.  
In the present model, selections are undertaken by an external entity, which can be interpreted 
as the employing company. The rules of selection are: 
(6) In constant intervals of time, the worst agents are excluded. The length of this interval is 
specified by the parameter v. Another parameter, r, specifies the precise percentile of 
agents to be excluded. 
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(7) The criterion of selection is the return achieved by agents i in the v periods preceding to t, 
denoted by ݃௜,௧,௩. Due to (3), this return is mirrored by the relative change of individual 
investment capital. ݃௜,௧,௩ can thus be written as:  
݃௜,௧,௩ ൌ ሺܥ௜,௧ െ ܥ௜,௧ି௩ሻ/ܥ௜,௧ି௩ (6) 
With v and r, the selection mechanism described above has two parameters, where v 
represents the “exclusion interval” and r the “exclusion rate”. Each parameter has a distinct 
function for the competition among agents. The exclusion rate has a direct effect on 
competitive pressure. The higher r is, the more agents are excluded, and the greater the 
outcome needed to survive. The exclusion interval, on the other hand, constitutes agents’ 
“probation period”. The higher v is, the more time agents have to produce investment returns.  
(iii)  The Genetic Algorithm:  
By specifying the set of agents to be excluded, the selection mechanism determines the 
outflow from the population. In contrast, the genetic algorithm relates to the inflow by 
establishing the character of agents entering the population.4  
Genetic algorithms, originated by J.H. Holland in 1975 [17], are learning methods which 
mimic the biological process of evolution. A genetic algorithm creates “candidate solutions” 
from a defined set of building blocks, which can be interpreted as genes. The construction of 
candidates is based on two genetic operators: crossover and mutation. Crossover is combining 
two candidate solutions, the “parents”, to create a new one. Then, some of the genes of the 
new code are modified slightly, which is denoted as mutation. Typically, the resulting 
                                                 
4 It is also common to interpret the selection mechanism as a part of the genetic algorithm. From that point of 
view, (iii) is equivalent to the “reproduction mechanism”. However, we do not adopt this view for the present 
model, because our selection mechanism could be implemented without genetic programming, and thus, does not 
contribute to the genetic feature of the model. 
- 14 - 
 
candidate solutions are not preselected by a defined fitness criterion but prove their fitness in 
competition with each other.  
The technique has considerable advantages. The modeler must not define an initial set of 
candidates to be evaluated but merely their building blocks. Therefore, less previous 
knowledge about possible solutions is required. Furthermore, the search space usually 
becomes extremely large. Thus, the solution finally found is likely to beat the best one in the 
limited set of alternatives the modeler would propose himself (with the restriction that the set 
of potential solutions is limited by construction rules and building blocks). 
Due to these features, genetic algorithms have proven to be a successful tool in economic 
modeling. Goals of application are in particular the derivation of optimal rules of trading and 
investment, as conducted by [21, 22, 23, 26, and 27]. A study which is related to the present 
one quite closely is [23]. Like in the present study, the agents in [23] build a portfolio by 
choosing the share of capital, s, to be invested in a risky asset; to find the optimal value, ݏ∗, 
the genetic algorithm is used. However, in contrast to the present study, the focus is not on 
professional investors and their competition, but agents seek to maximize their own utility 
function. The latter follows the standard CARA design (ܷሺݓሻ ൌ െexpሺെߛ ∗ ݓሻ), with ߛ 
being the risk-aversion coefficient and ݓ the investment payoff), which excludes risk-seeking 
behavior ex ante. The goal of the study is to explore if evolution will lead to the optimal 
solution ݏ∗ – the one which generates the greatest utility on average. (Analytically, ݏ∗ is easy 
to derive: ݏ∗ ൌ ሺߤோ െ ݌ோሻ/ߛߪோଶ, with ݌ோ being the price of the risky asset). The author finds 
that this result is actually reached if simulation time is long enough. For shorter horizons, 
however, the solutions tend to exceed ݏ∗. The reason for the latter finding is quite interesting: 
In the short term, agents holding large shares of risky assets can be lucky and achieve great 
utility. This creates a bias towards greater solutions for s than ݏ∗. The influence of chance 
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tends to decrease if the period under observation is longer. In a different fashion, this 
phenomenon will also be observable in the present study.  
The implementation of the genetic algorithm in our model is relatively easy because agents 
are characterized by two attributes only: the share of capital invested in the risky asset, ݏ௜, and 
the amount of additional risk undertaken, ߜ௜. The algorithm can be outlined as follows: 
(8) The excluded agents are replaced by “newcomers”. The investment behavior of the 
newcomers is determined by a genetic algorithm. 
(9) Each newcomer has two genetic parents, who are randomly chosen survivors of the 
present selection.  
(10) Initially, each of the two attributes of the newcomer is adopted identically from a 
different parent. This leads to a temporary setting of attributes.  
(11) The final setting is reached by a slight, random alteration of one randomly chosen 
attribute of the temporary setting.  
In the algorithm described above, rule (10) reflects crossover, and (11) mutation. Together 
with (9), (10) guarantees that an investment behavior is more likely to spread the more 
successful it has proven to be for the survival of competition. Rule (11) effects that virtually 
any investment behavior, that is, any combination of values of ݏ௜ and ߜ௜ can emerge. In other 
words, any of the portfolios marked in figure 2 is actually possible. 
In the following, the evolutionary model is used to explore two principal research questions:  
- Will evolutionary competition always lead to the prevalence of agents with efficient 
portfolios? Transferred to the model world: Will there be any agents with ߜ௜ ൐ 0 and ݏ௜ ൏ 1 
at the simulation end? 
- 16 - 
 
- Which investment behavior is most successful in competition under different competitive 
conditions? Transferred to the model world: Which values of ߜ௜ and ݏ௜ will have emerged 
under different settings of competition parameters, v and r? 
To answer these questions, simulation experiments are conducted, whose setup will be 
described in the following section.  
3.2 Simulation Setup 
The model calibration consists in the setting of six parameters: the three asset parameters, ߤோ, 
ߤ௅ and ߪோଶ; the two competition parameters, v and r; and the size of the population, N. 
According to rule (2) in Section 3.2, the asset parameters are subject to the restrictions 
ߤோ ൐ ߤ௅, and ߪோଶ ൐ 0.  Complying with these restrictions, we set ߤோ ൌ 3%, ߤ௅ ൌ 0%, and 
ߪோ ൌ 5%. Judged by empirical data, this setting can be regarded as rather conservative. For 
example, in the time from 1950 to 2009, the inflation adjusted total return per year produced 
by US large company stocks (S&P 500) was 9.68% on average with a standard deviation of 
17.40%.5 Thus, the risky asset in our model still has a less risky profile than respective 
equivalents in practice.6 The competition parameters, v and r, represent the independent 
variables. The exclusion interval v is incremented from 1 to 20 period(s), while the exclusion 
rate r is altered from 0.05 to 0.95 in steps of 0.05. Each combination of v and r signifies a 
different setup of competition, which gives a total of 380 scenarios to be simulated. Finally, N 
is set to 10,000. The large number of agents makes sure that the result of evolution can be 
reliably attributed to a systematic advantage of the respective investment behavior. The 
                                                 
5 Data Sources: Ibbotson Associates (Nominal Total Return); Bureau of Labor Statistics (Inflation Rates).  
6 The reason not to adopt empirical data is that the empirical values vary largely relative to the time frame 
considered, as economic conditions are continuously changing. For example, between 1990 and 2009, the 
respective return is merely 2.79% with a variance of 19.52%. In conclusion, the empirical data are of little use 
for a reliable estimation of the risk-return profile of today’s risky assets. Therefore we choose an artificial setting 
that appears to be realistic but conservative in so far as risky assets with comparable profiles are likely to exist in 
reality. 
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simulation runs terminate either if convergence is reached such that no significant change of 
agent attributes occurs anymore, or, in case of no convergence, if the path of evolution is 
evident (the latter will sometimes occur with regard to ߜ௜, which tends to rise continuously 
under specific competitive conditions). The initial setting of portfolio parameters is ݏ௜ ൌ ߜ௜ ൌ
0.5, ∀݅ , which corresponds to an inefficient portfolio. Agents thus have to learn an efficient 
investment behavior. 
3.3      Results 
Figure 3 depicts the results of the simulation experiments in an illustrative two-dimensional 
scheme. The upper lattice shows the share of capital invested in the risky asset, ݏ௜, the bottom 
one the risk undertaken additionally, ߜ௜. Each square represents a particular setup of 
competition, as specified by the setting of exclusion interval v and exclusion rate r. Different 
gray-levels indicate the corresponding value of the dependent variables at the simulation end. 
The general rule is: the darker the square, the greater the value of the respective variable. In 
particular, white can be read as “0”. With regard to ݏ௜, black stands for “1” (by definition ݏ௜ 
can never exceed 1). Regarding ߜ௜, black stands for extremely large values. The respective 
squares correspond to setups in which convergence is not reached. Hence, the values would 
continue to rise if the simulation went on. The lattices can be divided into five numbered 
areas. Each area represents a characteristic asset portfolio.  
-- Figure 3 about here – 
Area 1: In this area, the exclusion rate r is relatively low but the exclusion interval v is short, 
that is, exclusions take place relatively often. With these competitive conditions, evolution 
leads to the emergence of a portfolio which consists entirely of riskless assets (ݏ௜ ൌ 0) and 
does not involve any additional risk (ߜ௜ ൌ 0). As explained in Section 3.1, this configuration 
belongs to the class of efficient portfolios. Related to the level of agents, the respective 
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portfolio corresponds to investors embodying maximum risk-aversion and skill, with the latter 
being interpreted as the ability to find an efficient composition of assets. The reason for the 
emergence of maximally conservative but efficient investment behavior lies in the specific 
requirements for survival. Due to the low exclusion rate, the prevention of extremely bad 
outcomes is sufficient for not being discarded. Furthermore, due to the short exclusion 
interval, random effects have hardly leveled out before returns are evaluated. As a result, 
undertaking risks is perilous, as risks raise the likelihood of attaining insufficient outcomes. 
Area 2: The portfolios built in area 2 differ relative to area 1 in the parameter ݏ௜. Investors 
continue to avoid additional risk (ߜ௜ ൌ 0) but now spend a positive fraction of capital on the 
risky asset (0 ൏ ݏ௜ ൏ 1). Comparing the competitive conditions of area 1 and 2 reveals that 
this difference can be due to two reasons: a slight rise of the exclusion rate (i), or of the 
exclusion interval (ii). The causal paths from (i) and (ii) to the increase of ݏ௜ are quite distinct. 
By (i), the return needed to survive is enhanced. Pure risk prevention does not imply the best 
probability of achieving the respective outcomes because the amount of return expectation 
foregone becomes too great. Investing some capital in the risky asset increases the return 
expectation and, thus, improves survivability. Accordingly, a mixture of risky and riskless 
assets provides the best evolutionary fitness. By (ii), the same result is obtained through an 
extension of probation time. If the exclusion interval is raised, return expectation carries more 
weight because random effects tend to level out, leading to an evolutionary boost of agents 
with a positive fraction of risky assets. In other words, undertaking risk becomes less perilous 
for being eliminated if probation time increases. Note that the respective portfolios remain 
efficient and investors still behave in a risk-averse manner, however, to a smaller degree than 
in area 1.  
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Area 3: In area 3, the exclusion rate and the exclusion interval have increased further. As a 
result, the tendencies described above disembogue into an extreme. The fittest strategy is now 
simply to maximize return expectation as reflected by the fact that portfolios are composed 
entirely of risky assets (ݏ௜ ൌ 1). This behavior reveals that risk-prevention does not provide 
any competitive advantage anymore. This result can be produced by a sufficient rise of any 
competition parameter; r or v. If r is raised sufficiently, any sacrifice of return expectation 
decreases evolutionary fitness because the relatively great outcomes needed are less likely to 
be attained. For a sufficient rise of v, any sacrifice of return expectation is harmful because 
return expectation tends to become the only criterion for survival.  
The investment behavior in area 3 corresponds to risk-neutrality. Risk-neutrality implies that 
risks are not regarded as being a “value per se”, which can be verified by the fact that agents 
do not undertake any risk if it does not enhance return expectation (ߜ௜ ൌ 0). Apparently, 
undertaking additional risk deteriorates evolutionary fitness. The reason is that the exclusion 
rate is still low enough so that preventing extremely bad outcomes remains paramount 
towards seeking extremely good ones. Additional risk, hence, is not needed but rather 
destructive as it raises the probability of performing badly.  
Area 4: Area 4 differs from area 3 in the very inclination of agents to undertake additional 
risk, which now converges at some positive value (0 ൏ ߜ௜ ൏ ൅∞). This behavior is risk-
seeking because agents accept risks even if the latter do not contribute to the maximization of 
return expectation. In other words, risk is regarded as a “value per se”. The dominance of risk-
seeking behavior is due to another rise of r, which has led to the transition of a critical level: 
0.5 or 50%. To understand the phenomenon, assume that ݒ ൌ 1 and that the population 
consists of two groups: The first group obtains a sure periodical return of μ percent. The 
second group gets the same return μ but additionally plays a fair lottery which gives them a 
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50% chance for the return ߤ ൅ ߪ, respectively ߤ െ ߪ in case of losing. It is easy to see that for 
both groups, the expected periodical return (ܧሾ݃௜,௧,ଵሿ) is equal to μ. If the population is 
sufficiently large, μ is also the median return; on average, half the population will achieve a 
return greater than μ whereas the other half falls below. However, if more than half of the 
population is excluded at selection periods (ݎ ൐ 0.5), the median return is not sufficient to 
proceed. This signifies a heavy competitive disadvantage for the first group because, in 
contrast to the second one, they never achieve a return greater than μ. The same occurs in the 
simulation. By choosing ߜ௜ ൌ 0, agents accumulate probability mass of their return 
distribution near their return expectation. This is disadvantageous as the expected return does 
not suffice to survive. Similar agents with ߜ௜ ൐ 0 have greater fitness as more probability 
mass lies above the return needed. In conclusion, risk per se generates evolutionary fitness.  
Still, the explanations above do not capture all mechanisms driving the simulation results. For 
example, they suggest that whenever ݎ ൐ 0.5, ߜ௜ ൐ 0, which, as shown by figure 3, is not 
true. Another fact left to clarify is the convergence of ߜ௜ on a specific value. Let us focus the 
latter phenomenon first. Basically, the convergence of ߜ௜ on ߜ∗ indicates that any agents with 
ߜ௜ ൐ ߜ∗ is less fit than an agent with ߜ௜ ൌ ߜ∗. The degree of risk which provides a competitive 
advantage, hence, is limited. To understand the cause, reconsider the second group mentioned 
above, which plays the lottery, and assume that ݒ ൌ 2, which implies the selection criterion to 
be ݃௜,௧,ଶ. Then, on average, half of the agents win in one period and lose in the other. The 
resulting return ݃௜,௧,ଶ is ሺ1 ൅ ߤ ൅ ߪሻሺ1 ൅ ߤ െ ߪሻ െ 1. It is easy to show that for any ߤ, this 
value decreases continuously with greater |ߪ|. In other words, agents who are moderately 
lucky achieve lower returns ݃௜,௧,ଶ (and thus are less likely to survive) if the variance of their 
periodical returns is greater. The same happens in the model. Agents with ߜ௜ ൐ ߜ∗ require 
more luck than agents with ߜ௜ ൌ ߜ∗ to obtain the same return ݃௜,௧,௩. This effect is absent if 
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ݒ ൌ 1 but increases for ݒ being incremented above. As a result, agents chose lower values of 
ߜ௜ , the greater ݒ. This also explains why for some ݎ ൐ 0.5, ߜ௜ ൌ 0. In the model, investing in 
the risky asset alone can generate the optimal return variance even without undertaking 
additional risk.  
Area 5: The results in area 5 differ sharply from all previous ones in several aspects. 
Technically, the competitive conditions in this area are the only ones which do not 
disembogue in a convergence of portfolio parameters. In particular, the tendency of ߜ௜ to rise 
does not settle down. Simultaneously, ݏ௜ fluctuates in a range below 1; an optimal weight of 
risky assets does not emerge. The chaotic pattern of different gray-levels confirms that the 
precise value of ݏ௜ at the simulation end is quite random. Because ݏ௜ ൏ 1 and ߜ௜ ൐ 0, the 
portfolios built are not efficient. In contrast to all previous ones, the competitive conditions in 
area 5 do not provoke the predominance of agents able or willing to choose an efficient 
composition of assets.  
The peculiarity of these results shows that the competition in area 5 follows a logic which is 
very distinct. Apparently, skill is not an essential property to survive. Seeking risks, however, 
becomes vitally important. Any agent improves her evolutionary fitness by raising ߜ௜. These 
results are caused by the particular setting of competition parameters. Due to the great value 
of r and relatively low v, agents require large profits in a short span of time. To increase their 
chance for such profits, they need to seek risks. However, investing in an equally risky 
manner than everyone else does not produce a competitive advantage. As a result, agents 
force each other into taking greater and greater risks in the attempt to excel their rivals. The 
counter effect described in area 4 – greater risks decreases the returns ݃௜,௧,௩ if being 
moderately lucky – is not relevant here because survival is only possible if very lucky.  
- 22 - 
 
Agents following these incentives build portfolios which enable them to attain huge profits. 
The actual return of these high-risk portfolios depends largely on chance. In contrast, 
differences in periodical return expectation, as determined by the setting of ݏ௜, merely account 
for a minor part of actual returns. Hence, skill is of little importance. These findings mirror 
the insights from the theoretical analysis in chapter 2: Since the outcome needed to survive is 
relatively great, risk-seekers possess greater evolutionary fitness than risk-averters, even 
though the outcome expectation of risk-seekers is worse. As a result, the competition between 
agents leads to the predominance of risk-seekers who have been lucky, but who are not 
necessarily skilled. 
Summary: The simulation results show that the fittest risk-preference is dependent 
significantly on competitive conditions. In this context, two competition parameters have 
proven to be decisive: the exclusion rate and the exclusion interval. The following 
relationships could be found: The greater the exclusion rate, that is, competitive pressure, the 
greater the advantage from risk-seeking behavior relative to risk prevention. Furthermore, the 
attractiveness of risky assets rises with greater exclusion interval, representing probation time, 
as chance tends to level out in the long run. Via these relationships, the setting of competition 
parameters can lead to various scenarios: risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, risk-seeking behavior 
and any risk preference in between can be the fittest behavior. In addition, the simulation 
results reflect that the more risk involved by portfolios, the more actual returns are shaped by 
randomness and the less by the return expectation. As a result, skill is less important for 
survival, the more risks agents take. This logic can lead to an extreme scenario in which 
competition does not select the most skilled because skill is almost entirely blurred by chance. 
This scenario tends to arise if competitive pressure is intense and the great returns needed to 
survive must be produced in a short span of time.  
- 23 - 
 
Of course, the above insights raise the question about the actual competitive conditions in the 
fund manager profession. Analyzing empirical data from 1992 to 1994, [9] finds that fear of 
being dismissed motivates young managers to choose low-risk portfolios. Against the 
background of our insights, this behavior indicates that competitive pressure was in the lower 
range in the time of data gathering. Future research should check if competitive conditions 
have changed today, which might contribute to the explanation of the attractiveness of high-
risk investments.  
4. CONCLUSION 
The present article explores the relationship between various competitive conditions and the 
evolutionary fitness of different risk preferences. The analysis is conducted theoretically as 
well as by an evolutionary multi-agent model that reproduces an exemplary empirical case in 
a stylized fashion: the competition among fund managers. This case reflects the problem very 
well because the risk preference of managers is a central determinant for the composition of 
their asset portfolio whose return managers compete about. To simulate how fund managers 
develop their strategies, a genetic algorithm is applied, which ensures that virtually any 
combination of portfolio parameters can emerge as the fittest. 
On the whole, we observe that competitive environments have great influence on risk 
preferences and investment behavior. Hereby, two variables play a central role. On the one 
hand, there is the exclusion rate. A high exclusion rate means high competitive pressure and 
creates the need for large outcomes. This makes risk-seeking behavior attractive because the 
probability of high outcomes is increased. On the other hand, the time conceded to agents to 
attain the outcomes is crucial as random effects tend to even out in the long-run. All in all, 
these mechanisms can cause the emergence of risk-aversion in any degree but also risk-
seeking behavior. 
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The latter fact gives raise to warnings. Under competitive conditions that favor risk-seeking 
behavior, the importance of skill decreases because actual outcomes are determined mostly by 
chance. In the extreme case, survivors are not the most skilled but simply the luckiest risk-
seekers. The simulation model reflects this phenomenon by showing that, in the respective 
competitive conditions, agents with inefficient portfolios can survive, provided that they 
choose high risk investments. Such scenarios are dangerous on any economic level, not only 
with reference to the competition between fund managers, because of two reasons. First, 
because the predominance of the most capable is undermined, and second, because the risky 
behavior of agents implies unforeseeable outcomes which run counter to economic stability. 
To prevent these scenarios, our study yields two recommendations. First, competitive pressure 
must be held strictly below some critical level from which risks per se generate a competitive 
advantage. In the model, this is achieved by setting the exclusion rate to a low or moderate 
level. Second, probation time should be sufficiently long such that skill instead of chance 
shapes individual outcomes. 
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Figure 1: Probability density functions of two alternative behaviors. 
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Figure 2: Risk-return diagram of portfolios possible.  
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Figure 3: Values of portfolio parameters at simulation end for variable settings of 
competition parameters. Greater values indicated by darker gray tone.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
To prove proposition 1, we have to show that the PDF of profile 2 is strictly greater than the 
one of profile 1 for ݔ → ൅∞. Since by assumption both profiles represent normal 
distributions, the inequality to prove can be expressed as follows: 
 
lim௫→ାஶ൭
1
√2ߨσଶ
݁ି
ሺ௫ାఓమሻమ
ଶ஢మమ ൐ 1√2ߨσଵ
݁ି
ሺ௫ାఓభሻమ
ଶ஢భమ ൱ 
s.c.:  
(i) ߤଶ ൌ ߤଵ ൅ Δఓ with Δఓ ∈ 	 ሿെ∞;൅∞ሾ  
(ii) σଶ ൌ σଵ ൅ Δ஢ with Δ஢ ൐ 0 and ൓ሺσଵ → 0ሻ 
 
To start, replace ߤଵ and ߪଵ by its correspondences. Logarithmize, and simplify the result. This 
gives: 
lim௫→ାஶ ቀ ሺ௫ିఓభା୼ഋ	ሻ
మ
ଶ஢భమାସ஢భ୼ಚାଶ୼ಚమ ൏ Ζቁ with Ζ ൌ
ሺ௫ିఓభሻమ
ଶ஢భమ ൅ Logሾσଵሿ െ Logൣσଵ ൅ Δఓ	൧. 
Next apply the equivalence 
௔
௕ା௖ ൌ
௔
௕ െ
௔௖
௕ሺ௕ା௖ሻ setting ܽ ൌ ሺݔ െ ߤଵ ൅ Δఓ	ሻଶ, ܾ ൌ 2σଵଶ, and  
ܿ ൌ 4σଵΔ஢ ൅ 2Δ஢ଶ . This gives: 
lim௫→ାஶ ൬
ܽ
ܾ െ
ܽܿ
ܾሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ ൏ Z൰ 
Expanding ܽ in the first term and rearranging the result leads to: 
lim௫→ାஶቆ
ሺݔ െ ߤଵሻଶ
ܾ ൅
Δఓଶ െ 2Δఓߤଵ ൅ 2Δఓݔ
2σଵଶ െ
ܽܿ
ܾሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ ൏ Zቇ 
Expanding Z and subtracting ሺ௫ିఓభሻమ௕  from both sides finally yields: 
Δఓଶ െ 2Δఓߤଵ ൅ 2Δఓݔ
2σଵଶ െ
ܽܿ
ܾሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ ൏ Logሾσଵሿ െ Logሾσଵ ൅ Δ஢ሿ 
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It can been seen that the instance of ݔ with the highest power is included in ܽ with ݔଶ. The 
limit of the left side as ݔ approaches ൅∞ is thus determined by the term െ ௔௖௕ሺ௕ା௖ሻ whose limit 
is െ∞. Since due to (ii), the limit of the right side is greater than െ∞ , the inequality is true. 
q.e.d. 
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